University of South Dakota

USD RED
Faculty Publications

University Libraries

5-14-2020

Safe management of bodies of deceased persons with suspected
or confirmed COVID-19: a rapid systematic review
Sally Yaacoub
Holger J. Schünemann
Joanne Khabsa
Amena El-Harakeh
Assem M. Khamis

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://red.library.usd.edu/ul-fp

Recommended Citation
Yaacoub, Sally; Schünemann, Holger J.; Khabsa, Joanne; El-Harakeh, Amena; Khamis, Assem M.;
Chamseddine, Fatimah; El-Khoury, Rayane; Saad, Zahra; Hneiny, Layal; Garcia, Carlos Cuello; MutiSchünemann, Giovanna E U; Bognanni, Antonio; Chen, Chen; Chen, Guang; Zhang, Yuan; Zhao, Hong; Abi
Hanna, Pierre; Loeb, Mark; Piggott, Thomas; Reinap, Marge; Rizk, Nesrine; Stalteri, Rosa; Duda, Stephanie;
Solo, Karla; and Chu, Derek, "Safe management of bodies of deceased persons with suspected or
confirmed COVID-19: a rapid systematic review" (2020). Faculty Publications. 41.
https://red.library.usd.edu/ul-fp/41

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Libraries at USD RED. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of USD RED. For more information, please
contact dloftus@usd.edu.

Authors
Sally Yaacoub, Holger J. Schünemann, Joanne Khabsa, Amena El-Harakeh, Assem M. Khamis, Fatimah
Chamseddine, Rayane El-Khoury, Zahra Saad, Layal Hneiny, Carlos Cuello Garcia, Giovanna E U MutiSchünemann, Antonio Bognanni, Chen Chen, Guang Chen, Yuan Zhang, Hong Zhao, Pierre Abi Hanna,
Mark Loeb, Thomas Piggott, Marge Reinap, Nesrine Rizk, Rosa Stalteri, Stephanie Duda, Karla Solo, and
Derek Chu

This article is available at USD RED: https://red.library.usd.edu/ul-fp/41

Safe management of bodies of deceased
persons with suspected or confirmed
COVID-19: a rapid systematic review
Sally Yaacoub   ,1 Holger J Schünemann,2,3 Joanne Khabsa   ,1
Amena El-Harakeh,1 Assem M Khamis   ,4 Fatimah Chamseddine,1
Rayane El Khoury,1 Zahra Saad,5 Layal Hneiny,6 Carlos Cuello Garcia,7
Giovanna Elsa Ute Muti-Schünemann,8 Antonio Bognanni,7 Chen Chen,9
Guang Chen,10 Yuan Zhang,7 Hong Zhao,11 Pierre Abi Hanna,12 Mark Loeb,13
Thomas Piggott,7 Marge Reinap,14 Nesrine Rizk,15 Rosa Stalteri,7 Stephanie Duda,7
Karla Solo   ,7 Derek K Chu   ,7 Elie A Akl,1,7,16 the COVID-19 Systematic Urgent
Reviews Group Effort (SURGE) group

To cite: Yaacoub S,
Schünemann HJ, Khabsa J,
et al. Safe management of
bodies of deceased persons
with suspected or confirmed
COVID-19: a rapid systematic
review. BMJ Global Health
2020;5:e002650. doi:10.1136/
bmjgh-2020-002650
Handling editor Soumyadeep
Bhaumik
►► Additional material is

published online only. To view
please visit the journal online
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/
bmjgh-2020-002650).

Received 14 April 2020
Revised 22 April 2020
Accepted 23 April 2020

© Author(s) (or their
employer(s)) 2020. Re-use
permitted under CC BY.
Published by BMJ.
For numbered affiliations see
end of article.
Correspondence to
Dr Elie A Akl; ea32@aub.edu.lb

Abstract
Introduction Proper strategies to minimise the risk of
infection in individuals handling the bodies of deceased
persons infected with 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV)
are urgently needed. The objective of this study was to
systematically review the literature to scope and assess
the effects of specific strategies for the management of
the bodies.
Methods We searched five general, three Chinese and
four coronavirus disease (COVID-19)–specific electronic
databases. We searched registries of clinical trials, websites
of governmental and other relevant organisations, reference
lists of the included papers and relevant systematic reviews,
and Epistemonikos for relevant systematic reviews. We
included guidance documents providing practical advice on
the handling of bodies of deceased persons with suspected
or confirmed COVID-19. Then, we sought primary evidence
of any study design reporting on the efficacy and safety
of the identified strategies in coronaviruses. We included
evidence relevant to contextual factors (ie, acceptability).
A single reviewer extracted data using a pilot-tested
form and graded the certainty of the evidence using the
GRADE approach. A second reviewer verified the data and
assessments.
Results We identified one study proposing an uncommon
strategy for autopsies for patients with severe acute
respiratory syndrome. The study provided very low-certainty
evidence that it reduced the risk of transmission. We
identified 23 guidance documents providing practical advice
on the steps of handling the bodies: preparation, packing,
and others and advice related to both the handling of the
dead bodies and the use of personal protective equipment
by individuals handling them. We did not identify COVID-19
evidence relevant to any of these steps.
Conclusion While a substantive number of guidance
documents propose specific strategies, we identified
no study providing direct evidence for the effects of any
of those strategies. While this review highlights major
research gaps, it allows interested entities to build their
own guidance.

Summary box
What is already known?
►► There is scarce evidence on the transmission of

coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and other
coronaviruses from the dead bodies of confirmed or
suspected cases.
►► There are uncertainties about how to handle the
bodies of deceased persons with confirmed or suspected COVID-19.

What are the new findings?
►► The main findings of this review are based on guid-

ance documents as opposed to primary studies.
►► We identified one eligible study that evaluated a

biosafety level 3 laboratory for autopsies of patients
with SARS.
►► We summarised the steps from 23 guidance documents providing practical advice on the steps of
handling the bodies and the use of personal protective equipment by individuals handling them.

What do the new findings imply?
►► WHO will use the findings of this study to inform its

response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
►► The interpretation of the findings needs to consider

that the included guidance are not supported by direct evidence.
►► There are additional research questions on the
modes of transmission of COVID-19 from dead bodies to individuals, the desirable and undesirable effects of each management strategy, and contextual
factors that require evidence.

Introduction
On 11 March, WHO characterised the 2019
novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) outbreak as a
pandemic. On 20 April 2020, the pandemic
had affected more than 2 400 000 individuals
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burial staff and religious staff. It is also a cultural challenge, as some cultural aspects and religious practices
may influence how the bodies are handled and the associated risk of transmission. Moreover, the acceptability
of different management strategies might vary across
cultural and religious groups.
The objective of this study was to systematically review
the literature to first scope, and then assess the effects of,
specific strategies for the management of the bodies of
deceased persons with suspected or confirmed COVID19. We conducted a rapid systematic review, commissioned by WHO, to be able to inform their response to
COVID-19 pandemic.
Methods
The protocol was submitted to PROSPERO; however, it
was not accepted because of the scoping component. We
have registered the protocol in Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/j3nft).

Figure 1

Study selection.

worldwide. Over the same time period, it has claimed the
lives of 165 000 individuals.1 More concerning than the
absolute number of deaths is their rate of increase.
The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2), which causes the coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19), has been characterised as highly contagious, with a relatively high case fatality rate, compared
with other viral respiratory infections. This has created
anxiety about the preparation and the burial of the
bodies of deceased persons with suspected or confirmed
COVID-19. There appears to be scarce evidence on the
transmission of COVID-19 and other coronaviruses from
the dead bodies of confirmed or suspected cases. In one
study, Liu et al reported that 27.8% of healthcare workers
in contact with deceased cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) contracted the coronavirus.2
In another study, Mahallawi reported a case of Middle
East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirus in nasal
secretions of a dead case.3 Similarly, there is confusion
about how to safely perform autopsies on those bodies.
Considering these uncertainties about how to handle the
bodies of deceased persons with confirmed or suspected
COVID-19 cases, answers to these questions are on the
priority list for WHO.
Individuals at risk include healthcare workers, morgue
staff, transport staff, family members, crematories staff,
2

Search strategy and selection criteria
We conducted a rapid systematic review to identify, select,
abstract, assess, and synthesise the available evidence
addressing our question of interest.4
We developed the search strategy with the assistance
of an information specialist experienced with systematic
reviews (LH). Two information specialists peer reviewed
the search strategy. Other members of the team, particularly the content experts, provided feedback to the search
strategy. An additional search strategy was developed to
identify indirect evidence from systematic reviews on
SARS and MERS. We searched the following general
electronic databases: Medline (using OVID platform),
PubMed, EMBASE, CINAHL (using OVID platform)
and the Cochrane Library. We also searched COVID-19-
specific electronic databases such as COVID-19 Open
Research Dataset (CORD-19), COVID-19 Research Database maintained by WHO (including its daily updates),
Epistemonikos COVID-19 L·OVE platform and EPPI
Centre living systematic map of the evidence. In addition,
we searched Chinese databases such as WHO Chinese
database, CNKI and China Biomedical Literature Service.
Online supplementary appendix 1 includes the search
strategies for the different general databases. The search
strategies combined medical subject headings (MeSH)
and keywords for the two following concepts: COVID-19
and dead bodies. PubMed search terms were informed by
the Biomedical Information of the Dutch Library Association specialists curated search blocks.5 The related
searches covered the date range from inception to 26
March 2020. We used no language restrictions.
Additional searches included searching for registered clinical trials in both the U.S. National Library of
Medicine Register of Clinical Trials (ClinicalTrials.gov)
and the WHO International Clinical Trials Registry Platform, searching for relevant documents on the websites
of governmental and other relevant organisations,
Yaacoub S, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002650. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002650
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Table 1 Characteristics of the included study
Study

Population

Li et al
(2005)10

23 pathologists
and technicians
performed 16
autopsies

Study
type
Case
study

Setting

Intervention and
comparator

Autopsy
►► Multicomponent
laboratory
intervention:
in China
construction,
PPE, disposal
and other
measures
components

Comparator

►► No

screening reference lists of the included papers and relevant systematic reviews, and searching Epistemonikos for
relevant systematic reviews addressing SARS and MERS.
We included studies meeting specific criteria for the
population, interventions, comparisons and outcomes
of interest. Our populations of interest included the
bodies of deceased persons with suspected or confirmed
COVID-19, and the individuals handling those bodies,
including nursing and medical personnel, morgue staff,
transport staff, family members, crematories staff, burial
staff and religious staff. In addition, and as a source of
indirect evidence for primary studies, we considered
primary studies and systematic reviews about the bodies
of deceased persons with suspected or confirmed infections with either SARS virus or the MERS virus, as well
as the individuals handling those bodies. The interventions of interest included any strategy to manage bodies
of deceased persons, during the different phases of
the process. These strategies would address either the
bodies themselves or the individuals handling them. The
outcomes of interest included risk of COVID-19 transmission to the individuals handling the bodies and to
members of the community, morbidity and mortality associated with COVID-19, unintended harms of the management strategies, acceptability by different stakeholders
(family members of the deceased person, members of the
community, individuals handling the dead bodies, health
authorities), and surrogate outcomes such as contact or
droplet transmission. Also eligible were studies providing
evidence relevant to contextual factors such as acceptability, feasibility, impact on equity and resources considerations related to the interventions of interest.
We included any study design including randomised
randomised studies (including
controlled trials, non-
cohort studies, case–control studies, case series and
case reports) and qualitative studies. In addition, we
included guidance documents on the handling of
bodies of deceased persons with suspected or confirmed
COVID-19 identified from the websites of relevant organisations and national authorities by content experts and
peer-reviewed literature.
Study selection
We exported the literature search results to EndNote
X9 for de-duplication, then to Covidence software. All
tested a standardised title and abstract
reviewers pilot-
screening form using the same 30 citations. Once the
Yaacoub S, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002650. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002650

comparator
group

Outcomes
Infections:

►► Proportion of infections: 0/23
►► Evaluation of decontamination measured by

Risk of
bias/quality
High risk of
bias

sarin simulant test: in the contaminated area,
sarin concentration decreased from 10 to 2 ppm
to 0 ppm, and sarin was undetectable in the
clean area and the semi-contaminated area

form was calibrated, the reviewers screened in duplicate
and independently all titles and abstracts using above
listed eligibility criteria. We obtained the full texts for
citations judged as potentially eligible by either reviewer.
All reviewers pilot-
tested a full-
text screening form
using the same five full-text articles. Once the form was
calibrated, the reviewers screened the full texts independently and in duplicate and resolved any conflicts
by discussion, or with the help of a third reviewer. We
recorded the primary reason for exclusion at the full-text
screening stage.
Data extraction
We developed and piloted with all reviewers a standardised data abstraction form in Excel.
Two independent reviewers extracted data using that
form. We extracted data about the following: study identifier; study design; setting; population characteristics;
intervention and comparator characteristics; outcomes
(quantitative if possible); source of funding and reported
conflicts of interests; ethical approval; study limitations or
other important comments. For the identified guidance
documents, a single reviewer extracted data and a second
reviewer verified the extracted data. We extracted data
about the publishing organisation and country, whether
the documents were dedicated to COVID-19 dead bodies
management, as well as specific guidance under each
step of the process. We also extracted information on
personal protective equipment (PPE).
Risk of bias assessment
One reviewer was to perform the risk of bias assessment
and a second reviewer would verify all assessments. We
Ottawa scale for non-
planned to use the Newcastle-
randomised studies.
Synthesis
We synthesised the data in both narrative and tabular
formats. A single reviewer graded the certainty of the
evidence using the GRADE approach and a second
reviewer verified all assessments.6 When applicable, we
followed published guidance for rating the certainty in
evidence in the absence of a single estimate of effect.7
We present the evidence using GRADE Evidence Profiles
developed in the GRADEpro (www.gradepro.org) software.8 9
3
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*Downgraded by two levels due to very serious risk of bias. A case study with high risk for confounding bias and selection bias.
†Downgraded by one level due to indirectness, as evidence related to SARS. Refer to the detailed indirectness assessment in the indirectness table.
‡Downgraded by two levels due to very serious imprecision. Low number of participants and events.
§Downgraded by two levels due to very serious indirectness as evidence related to SARS and to a surrogate outcome. Refer to the detailed indirectness assessment in the indirectness table.
PPE, personal protective equipment.

Critical
⨁◯◯◯
Very low
1

Observational
studies

Very serious*

Not serious

Very serious§

Not serious

None

Sarin concentration in the contaminated area
decreased from 10 to 2 ppm to 0 ppm, and sarin
was undetectable in the clean area and the semi-
contaminated area

Critical
⨁◯◯◯
Very low
Out of the 23 personnel who performed the
autopsies, none demonstrated any evidence on
SARS infection
Very serious‡
Serious†
Not serious
Very serious*
Observational
studies
1

Suspected or confirmed COVID-19 infection (assessed with proportion of personnel with SARS infection)

None

Other
considerations
Imprecision
Indirectness
Inconsistency
Risk of bias
Study design
Number of
studies

Suspected or confirmed COVID-19 infection (assessed with evaluation of decontamination measured by sarin simulant test in a SARS laboratory)



No specific
manage
ment
Relative
strategy
(95% CI)

Effect

Absolute
(95% CI)

Importance
Certainty

Specific
manage
ment
strategy
(including
ventilation,
PPE and
disposal)

Number of patients

GRADE evidence profile

Certainty assessment

Table 2

4

Results
Results of the selection process
Figure 1 shows the study selection represented in a
PRISMA flow chart. We identified 23 guidance documents specific to COVID-19. We did not identify any
study providing direct evidence related to COVID-19
(whether on health effects or for contextual evidence).
We identified one eligible study that evaluated a biosafety
level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory for autopsies of patients with
SARS.10 We did not identify any relevant systematic review
on SARS or MERS.
Summary of direct empirical findings
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the one included
comparative study
study.10 In summary, it was a non-
conducted in a BSL-3 laboratory for autopsies of clinically confirmed or suspected SARS infections in China.
It included 16 autopsies performed by 23 pathologists
and technicians. The intervention was a complex intervention with components including construction, PPE
and disposal. In terms of findings, the authors reported
that none of the 23 involved individuals was diagnosed
with a SARS infection. In addition, the investigators used
the sarin simulant test to assess decontamination. Sarin
concentration decreased from 10 to 2 ppm to 0 ppm in
the contaminated area and was undetectable in the clean
area and the semi-contaminated area.
We report the evidence profile in table 2. We judged
the certainty of evidence as very low, mainly due to very
serious risk of bias, and very serious imprecision.
Summary of the guidance documents
We identified 23 guidance documents providing practical advice on handling suspected or confirmed cases
of COVID-19 corpses throughout the different phases.
We have summarised the content of these documents in
three tables in online supplementary appendix 2.
Table 3 shows the characteristics of the 23 included guidance documents on the strategies for the management of
dead bodies of confirmed or suspected COVID-19 cases.
The majority of the documents were published in
English (n=18, 78%). Eight of the 23 documents (35%)
were entirely dedicated to handling of COVID-19 dead
bodies. Most of the documents specified that bodies were
for suspected or confirmed COVID-19 corpses (n=18,
78%). Settings most commonly addressed in those documents were the hospitals (n=12, 52%), healthcare facilities (n=4, 17%) and communities (n=3, 13%).
Online supplementary appendix 2 table A synthesises,
across the included guidance documents, the strategies for the management of the bodies of deceased
persons with suspected or confirmed COVID-19. The
strategies include one or more of the following steps:
body preparation (includes healthcare setting and
healthcare setting), packing, transport to storage
non-
site, storage site, viewing, embalming, burial, cremation and other measures. Five documents out of the 23
(22%) report taking into consideration factors related
Yaacoub S, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002650. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002650
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2020

2020
March, 2020

Europe

Hong Kong
Sweden
United
Nations
China
Sri Lanka
Europe
UK

Estonia

European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control16

Food and Environmental Hygiene Department17

Public Health Agency of Sweden18

WHO12

Zhejiang University School of Medicine19

Ministry of Health in Sri Lanka20

European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control21

UK Government22

Estonian Health Board23

South Africa March, 2020

The Centre for Respiratory Diseases and
Meningitis and Outbreak Response, Division
of Public Health Surveillance and Response,
National Institute for Communicable Diseases of
the National Health Laboratory Services and the
National Department of Health, South Africa25

2020

UK

Department of Health and Social Care, Public
Health Wales, Public Health Agency Northern
Ireland, Health Protection Scotland and Public
Health England24

Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Directorate Bangladesh Not specified
General of Health Services (Emergency Medical
Relief)14

2020

March, 2020

Not specified

March, 2020

March, 2020

February, 2020

March, 2020

India

March, 2020

Government of India Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare Directorate General of Health
Services (EMR Division)13

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
USA

Country
15

Month, year of
last update

English

English

English

Estonian

English

English

English

English

English

Swedish

English

English

English

English

Language

✓

✓

✓

✓

Not specified

Suspected or
confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

National Health Service (NHS) and healthcare settings ☓
(that include infection prevention and control)

Healthcare workers in medical laboratories, provincial ☓
health departments and emergency medical support
team

Healthcare workers and other personnel working
in points of entries, quarantine centres, hospitals,
laboratories, primary healthcare and community
settings

☓

Suspected

Suspected or
confirmed

☓

✓

Not specified

First responders and others in close contact with
suspected cases including professionals, members
of voluntary organisations and emergency service
professionals. Also, for Police officers, Border Force
officers and Immigration Enforcement officers

Suspected or
confirmed

EU/EEA healthcare facilities and healthcare providers ☓

Suspected or
confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

☓

✓

Confirmed

Confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

Status of
deceased
COVID-19

☓

Health sector in Sri Lanka

Medical personnel involved in the management of
coronavirus

Healthcare managers, mortuaries, religious and
public health authorities, and families

Healthcare pathological units, forensic units, religious ✓
communities and funeral contractors

Hospitals, public mortuaries, funeral workers and
personnel on conveyances

Public health authorities in European Union (EU)/
European Economic Area (EAA) Member States and
the UK

Healthcare workers and personnel who handle dead
bodies in isolation area, mortuary, and ambulance
and workers in crematorium/burial

Medical examiners, coroners, pathologists and other
workers involved in providing postmortem care, and
local and state health departments

Target audience

Document
dedicated
to handling
deceased

Continued

Ambulance
(death during
transportation)

Not specified

Hospitals

Hospitals

Communities

Hospitals and
communities

Hospitals

Hospital

Healthcare
facilities

Not specified

Not specified

Hospitals and
communities

Healthcare
facilities/hospitals

Not specified

Setting of
handling
deceased

Characteristics of the guidance documents on the strategies for the management of the bodies of deceased persons with suspected or confirmed COVID-19

Publishing organisation

Table 3
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Denmark
Norway

Syndhedstyrelsen33

Helsedirektoratet34

*Guidance document specific to autopsy.

February, 2020

China

Experts32

March, 2020

March, 2020

March, 2020

February, 2020

China
Society of Pathological Doctors, Chinese
Medical Doctors Association; Chinese Society of
31
Pathology, Chinese Medical Association

India

Researchers30

February, 2020

February, 2020

New South
Wales

Clinical Excellence Commission—New South
Wales Government28
UK

March, 2020

New South
Wales

Clinical Excellence Commission—New South
Wales Government27

The Royal College of Pathologists29

March, 2020

Country

Month, year of
last update

USA

Partners in Health

26

Publishing organisation

Table 3 Continued

Danish health authorities, health service settings and
healthcare workers

Pathologists

Pathologists

Not specified

Pathologists, trainees, anatomical pathology
technologists and onsite managers in mortuaries.
Also, hospital managers overseeing the mortuary,
local authority mortuary managers and coroners

Personnel in hospital or similar healthcare setting

Personnel in healthcare or residential and aged care
facilities

Personnel in hospitals involved in screening, triage,
infection control and mortuaries

Target audience

Norwegian Healthcare workers

Danish

Chinese

Chinese

English

English

English

English

English

Language

Suspected or
confirmed

☓

☓

☓

Suspected or
confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

☓

☓

Not specified

☓

Suspected or
confirmed

Suspected or
confirmed

☓

✓

Suspected or
confirmed

Status of
deceased
COVID-19

☓

Document
dedicated
to handling
deceased

Not specified

Not specified

Hospitals*

Hospitals*

Healthcare
facilities

Hospitals*

Healthcare
facilities/hospitals

Residential
and aged care
facilities (including
multipurpose
service residential
care)

Hospitals

Setting of
handling
deceased
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to the context when applying the recommendations
provided. These include cultural, religious and familial
factors. Out of the five documents, two specify taking
these factors into account for all the recommendations,
whereas the remaining are specific to cremation (n=2)
(online supplementary appendix 2 table A) and autopsies (n=1) (online supplementary appendix 2 table C).
Figure 2 represents an infographic summarising the steps
reported in the guidance documents. Online supplementary appendix 3 includes the same infogrpahic in the
following languages: Arabic, French, German, Italian and
Portugese. The expanded version of the infographic is in
the online supplementary appendix 1.
Online supplementary appendix 2 table B consists
of a matrix indicating what PPE was recommended
for use in each of the steps of the management of the
bodies of deceased persons with suspected or confirmed
COVID-19.
Online supplementary appendix 2 table C provides
the recommendations in the guidance documents for
performing autopsies on the bodies of deceased persons
with suspected or confirmed COVID-19. The main
elements are the indications to perform autopsies, the
physical environment and disinfection, the professionals
involved and limitations on individuals involved.
Discussion
Summary of findings
In summary, we did not identify any direct evidence
relating to the effects of specific strategies for the management of the bodies of deceased persons with suspected or
confirmed COVID-19. Even when expanding to consider
indirect evidence, we found scarce literature relating to
SARS and MERS infections. The one study we identified
provides very low certainty evidence that the specific
approach used by Li et al to set up the autopsy laboratory reduced the risk of transmission to the personnel
handing dead bodies.10
Strengths and limitations
This review has a number of strengths. First, we searched
for indirect evidence relating to two other coronaviruses
that are similarly dangerous to COVID-19, that is, SARS
and MERS. Second, we used a very comprehensive search
of both the indexed and grey literatures, with no restrictions to specific languages or study design. Third, and
despite the short timeline for conducting the review (7
days), we were able to use a standard systematic review
methodology for the primary studies, that is, without
any shortcuts sometimes used in rapid reviews. We were
able to achieve this through the involvement of a large
and experienced systematic review team. One limitation
of our study is that we did not use a duplicate approach
for data extraction and synthesis for the guidance documents.
Interpretation of findings
The primary evidence was limited only to management of
autopsies and does not cover the main steps of handling
Yaacoub S, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002650. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002650

of dead bodies. Also, the availability of BSL-3 laboratories and autopsy rooms may be a barrier in many settings,
especially for low-resources settings.
The guidance documents proved to be very useful in
identifying discrete steps in the management of bodies of
deceased persons with suspected or confirmed COVID19. We noted some variability in the strategies adopted for
the different steps across these documents. One limitation of the guidance documents is the lack of consideration of cultural practices around death (eg, cremation
vs burial, peri-cremation/burial practices, cultural preferences). Still, and given the lack of primary research,
these documents can be helpful to governmental or non-
governmental entities when developing such guidance.
Implications for public health practice
There might be significant harms from the transmission
of COVID-19 from the bodies of deceased persons considering the number of deaths currently observed and anticipated in the COVID-19 pandemic. There is one report
on a forensic practitioner in Thailand who had contact
with biological samples and corpses of COVID-19 and
contracted the virus.11 This systematic review showed that
gaps exist in the evidence base for different management
strategies of the bodies of deceased persons for coronaviruses in general, and COVID-19 in particular.
In the absence of such evidence, the synthesis of
guidance documents, provided in online supplementary appendix 2, could inform public health protocols
around the handling of dead bodies. For example, the
current interim WHO guidance draws on evidence from
other respiratory viruses including pandemic influenza.12
Given gaps in direct evidence on COVID-19, the findings
continue to be relevant. However, the interpretation of
these findings needs to consider that the included guidance are not supported by direct evidence.
While the risk of infection from dead bodies is deemed
to be low, a precautionary approach using PPE including
gloves, gown, mask and goggles would be reasonable
where direct contact with dead bodies or fluid spray
from dead bodies is possible. Only two guidance documents recommended the use of N95 respirators for the
handling of dead bodies.13 14 Given the absence of direct
research evidence, any recommendations on PPE use for
handling bodies of deceased people in different settings
must balance the uncertainty of the benefits and harms
with feasibility considerations, such as PPE stock and
availability.
Implications for research
There are three types of related questions that require
research evidence. First, there is a need for evidence on
the modes of transmission of COVID-19 from bodies
of deceased persons to the different types of individuals handling those bodies. Such evidence is essential
to propose potentially effective management strategies.
Second, there is a need for evidence on the desirable
and undesirable health effects and other consequences
7
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Figure 2 Infographic illustrating the different steps in the management of bodies of deceased person with suspected or
confirmed COVID-19. PPE, personal protective equipment.
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of proposed management strategies. Third, there is
a need for contextual evidence in relation to these
proposed management strategies (ie, acceptability,
feasibility, impact on equity, resources considerations).
Such evidence is extremely important given the cultural
and religious dimensions of the handling of bodies of
deceased patients.
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